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The Sublime Triplets of
Historical Consciousness
On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and Its Aftermath, by Ernst
Breisach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 243. $41.00 cloth,
$16.00 paper.
Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History, by Peter
Fritzsche. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Pp. 288. $27.95
hardcover.
Déjà vu: Aberrations of Cultural Memory, by Peter Krapp. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2004. Pp. xxviii + 218. $59.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.
History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory, by Dominick LaCapra.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pp. ix + 274. $49.95 cloth, $19.95
paper.
Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting, by Harald Weinrich. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2004. Pp. vi + 254. $35.00 cloth.
One of my favorite childhood memories revolves around a campfire story written in the early twentieth century, “Tajar Tales.” The Tajar is something like a
badger, something like a jaguar, and something like a tiger, and he lives in and
around the camps that children attend each summer. The Tajar possesses magical qualities: “If you should see him once, you would forget what he looks like.
But if you should see him twice, you would forget to forget what he looks like,
and that would be quite fatal.” The precise form of this fatality is never spelled
out, and the children hanging spellbound upon the Tajar’s many follies, such as
a penchant for dancing in the moonlight in compromising fashion, are left with
the admonition that although they may “know” what a tajar is, they may never
“see” him. To see is to endanger memory by lapsing into forgetfulness.
Reading this story to my preschooler at bedtime, and concurrently reading
the books under review here, enhanced the theme of dangerous memory, the
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kind that threatens the existence of a beloved entity. Deliberate forgetting to forget, after all, is the choice made by any historian who cares enough about the past
to desire its memory—it is hardly “fatal.” Only Friedrich Nietzsche would go so
far, in his Untimely Meditations, as to suggest that “monumental” history allows
the “dead to bury the living,” permitting the folly of fatality to strike at the heart
of civilization. Most historians regard the compulsion toward memory as salutary, and forgetting as abomination. With respect to the traumas of the twentieth
century, in fact, “never forget” has become a mantra of the sacred nature of memory. What is the lesson of the Tajar? What magical knowledge is lost when we forget to forget?
The relationship between memory and forgetting, between history and the
past, is complicated and fraught. The terms do not simply negate each other as
opposites, either in antithesis or in dialectical overcoming. For the modern historian and Annaliste Marc Bloch, it follows that “Forgetting is not the opposite of
recollection, for its opposite would be complete breakdown, one that no longer
concerns anyone, that offers no admonishment, and to which no consideration
can lead” (qtd. in Krapp, 63). The existence of forgetting, as epiphenomenon,
persists in admonition and caring; it remains connected to ethical relationships
such as that between debt and credit, forgiveness and the “unforgiven,” as will be
explored below. The true opposite of memory would be oblivion, a nothingness
that denies memory’s Being. As Harald Weinrich’s richly detailed survey reminds
us, the river Lethe figured in Greek mythology as the place where forgetfulness
found its shape, because true oblivion literally transcended expression. The river
offered a reflection of all that was wrong about forgetting, all the harm and misery caused, in the mirror surface of its waters. Indeed, the Greek word for “truth”
(aletheia) can be semantically construed as “unforgotten or the not-to-be forgotten”: “In fact, for hundreds of years Western philosophical thought, following the
Greeks, sought truth on the side of not-forgetting and thus of memory and
remembrance; only in modern times has it more or less hesitantly accepted to
grant forgetting a certain truth as well” (4). The ethical or moral imperatives of
memory have shaped modern insistence that forgetting is bad, or wrong: a sign
of error, terror, or both. But it was not always so. Weinrich’s book reminds us that
within the Western tradition there has continually been space for forgetfulness.
Weinrich is a witty, erudite raconteur. He draws on dozens of famous and
lesser-known writers to illustrate the arts of forgetting across time. We become
reacquainted, for example, with “the Chewer of Paris,” Charles Labussiere, who
saved Frenchmen during the Reign of Terror by “organizing forgetting” (105).
Masticating the evidence, he destroyed lists of aristocrats doomed to the guillotine. In the postwar period, Weinrich highlights Heinrich Boll’s antihero, the
“thrower-away,” a “mentally ill/asocial” employee of a large firm whose job is to
detect and destroy junk mail before it reaches its recipients (207). Focusing his
attention on European and particularly German writers, Weinrich misses
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another “thrower-away”—George Orwell’s “memory hole” in 1984—but his
point is nonetheless vividly illustrated. Intentional destruction of memory is a
venerable tradition in Western civilization.
An ars oblivionis, or art of forgetting, was conceived by the ancient Greeks.
Weinrich traces the tradition from Homer, Simonides, and Themistocles, who
suffered less from a poor memory than an excessively good memory from which
he desired relief (11). Ovid offers the first instance in a long tradition of erotic
techniques of forgetting: detailing the beloved’s worst characteristics in order to
replace fond memories with disgust; traveling in order to be distracted (potentially by newly acquainted lovers); sleeping it off; and most likely to succeed, the
tactic of taking a new lover (18–19). Later, Casanova perfected these same techniques. Casanova’s literary career blossoms on the ruins of his short-lived ecclesiastical endeavors: on the occasion of his first sermon, which he forgets and is
unable to deliver, Casanova discovers his true calling. Born thus of forgetfulness,
his literary-erotic impulses became entwined: “Casanova also loved books, and
he tried to read each woman like a book; and like a reader, in order to open one
book he had to close another one. Thus there was a break between two loves or
two readings, and in the erotic language of Casanova’s time this break was called
forgetting” (81). This period of forgetting does not preclude later remembering,
but in the style of ancient philosophical recommendations, he uses sex to distract
and forget.
The relationship between literature and forgetting also implicates the
process of writing itself. Weinrich recalls the strange case of the elderly Immanuel
Kant. Musing on the nature of memory, Kant drew on the Greeks to suggest that
“the art of writing had led to the decline of memory (had made it in part unnecessary)” (72). Writing, in externalizing the memory function and creating a
record, made memorization superfluous; one did not need to be able to recall
what one could look up again (and this is well before the Internet!). One only
needed to be able to recall what one wanted to look up. In this regard, Kant’s dismissal of his faithful servant, Martin Lampe, troubled Kant’s students and biographers. Kant, whose daily habits were so famously regular that the housewives
of Königsberg set their clocks by him, had always relied on Lampe to maintain
his routines. At the age of seventy-eight, Kant dismissed his servant and left a puzzling note, which later turned up in his papers: “The name Lampe must now be
completely forgotten” (68). Why write down a command to forget? Would not
inscription reinforce memory, as with so many students’ notes? And why the temporal imperative of “now”? Weinrich speculates that this apparent conundrum
reflected the elderly philosopher’s growing impatience with distractions. Lampe,
who had shielded his employer from life’s mundane details, had himself become
a distraction—or, more precisely, he had become emblematic of a more general
deterioration of memory and resultant confusion in ways that we might now recognize as symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease. Was the note about Lampe “an
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expression of pious resignation with regard to the disaster of forgetting that was
overtaking him with fatal necessity, and into whose darkness he now had to sink”
(77)?
Weinrich raises the specter of Alzheimer’s only briefly, but anyone who has
lived with the disease will shudder in recognition at those notes. The disease is a
thief, stealing memory and forgetting alike, robbing its victims of their own sense
of knowing whether they have in fact forgotten. Pathologies of memory such as
Alzheimer’s, unwilling forgetfulness, shadow the arts of forgetting. Ultimately,
forgetting is not something that anyone appears able to control: we may wish to
forget, especially experiences of trauma, to push them out of our consciousness,
but we can often do so only by pushing it further inside ourselves. After Freud,
no one can ignore the realm of the unconscious and repression, and Weinrich
considers him as well. Still, unsuccessful forgetting and undesired forgetting
resemble twin frustrations.
Weinrich draws on literary figures and philosophers, but one might as well
ask about the other psychologists, historians, and scientists who studied memory and forgetting and how that research has shaped what we can know or hope
to achieve through memory. In an odd epilogue, Weinrich entertains the notion
that scientists practice their own form of forgetting: by adhering to international
protocols for research and publication, most forget (discard) their native language in favor of English, as well as anything published outside of a few preferred
journals in the past five years, and live by the paradoxical rule, “follow the mainstream of research—you can forget the rest. . . . Mainstream research, which
everyone follows—you can forget that” (217). Forgetting here takes the form of
disciplinary norms and competitive structures of research: in the realm of neglect, what is not referred to is lost or forgotten.
Homogenization through specialization also concerns Dominick LaCapra,
who devotes a chapter of History in Transit to “the university in ruins,” assessing
Bill Readings’s book of the same name. Late-twentieth-century universities, he
argues, overemphasize the production of “mini-me” academics, teaching undergraduates to ignore their own proclivities in favor of preprofessional training and
“sky-high” theory (156). Forgetting the liberal arts tradition, according to
LaCapra, produces students who read only the latest journal articles by the
hippest theorists or those who are conditioned to expect a “fee-for-credit educational service industry that sells ‘McNuggets’ of knowledge” (203). Scientific
praxis and educational experience falter on the same forgetfulness of the power
of individual, intellectual critique.
LaCapra’s book culminates with his reading of Readings in order to rescript
the role of the intellectual. Both the student and the professor need to have room
to become “public intellectuals” in the Sartrean sense of the term: the intellectual
must again become “someone who does not simply mind her or his own business” (248). He rightly points out that the 1990s backlash against the academy
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replicates a well-worn and familiar charge: that the academy has forgotten its
“true” purpose—not just in the 1990s but in the 1950s, 1920s, 1900s, nineteenth century, eighteenth century, and so on. As the role of the university
changed in modernity and it began to produce civil servants and replenish its
own support staff of academics, its critics have constantly complained on behalf
of students and professors, and society at large. LaCapra calls for graduate students and undergraduates alike to free themselves of those critical expectations
as well as from faculty who would have them merely mimic academic freedom.
The model for this recovered/remembered freedom, presumably, is LaCapra’s
method of critical reading. Each of his books (and there are many) in the past
decade has pursued readings of recently published work—intellectual history as
historiographical critique. In these books (references to which repetitiously stud
the footnotes of History in Transit), LaCapra presents himself in the persona of the
instructor, the first-person voice emanating from within the institutional authority of the university. He conducts an ongoing dialogue with scholars and his own
previous writing. Reading and engaging cultural theorists such as Giorgio Agamben, LaCapra interrogates both the text and others’ reading of his own work
(which invariably emerges unscathed from the encounter).
LaCapra’s main critical themes have persistently included psychoanalytical
frameworks, especially the concepts of transference, trauma, and “working
through.” He insists on their relevance not only for individuals under analysis but
for historical collectives as well (73). He redefines transference in terms of historical consciousness, as “one’s implication in the other or the object of study with
the tendency to repeat in one’s own discourse or practice tendencies active in, or
projected into, the other or object” (74). The crux of his concern lies in the “limit
case” of historical trauma, the Holocaust. LaCapra reaches beyond the “limits of
representation” to focus on a specific aspect of the interaction between the past
and the present: an experience of the sublime. “Understood as a displacement of
the sacred or a transfiguration of the traumatic” (11), the moment of sublime
ecstasy or empathy can be experienced through reading trauma testimonies.
LaCapra wonders whether such an experience can or should be “sought in politics, collective action, or even commentary on the extreme or traumatic experience of others” (11). This notion of the sublime relies upon Romantic as well as
spiritual notions of revelation; within modernity, the sublime figures as a
moment of rapture and/or rupture, when experience baffles comprehension and
hints at greater knowledge just beyond one’s grasp. The appropriate, and only,
response is temporary silence, followed by a desire to replicate the experience
and communicate it, to get beyond silence. Displaced to the secular realm, the
sublime’s semi-sacred character is revealed in the extremities of human experience. The “Shoah becomes a cypher for the sublime” (155). Readers who
encounter genocide at the removes of historical distance and literary figuration
are nonetheless empathically compelled; while they do not reenact or experience
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the historical trauma as event, they experience the trauma of acquiring knowledge about the limits of experience, and the dawning awareness that what might
be beyond might also be within: “enabled by internal alterity (or the unconscious)” (77). It might be possible, LaCapra speculates, along with Saul Friedlander, to conceive of a radically new sublimity, experienced “through the
suffering of others” (147).
LaCapra chides Derrida for reading Heidegger’s silence about Nazi atrocities
during and after the Third Reich as an appropriate, even honest acknowledgment
of incapacity, in the old schema of Romantic responses to the sublime (which
would be to credit Heidegger both with acknowledging the atrocities and accepting some responsibility, at least as fellow-traveler, for their occurrence—which
would require a leap of faith; see 152). But if silence is no longer an appropriate
way to respond to perceptions of apophatic sublimity (literally, an experience
beyond words), LaCapra is equally critical of Agamben’s attempts to respond to
the Holocaust from the “postapocalyptic Auschwitz-now-everywhere hyperbole” (166). Agamben overstates his identification with the abjection of the
Muselmänner, as described by Primo Levi. Those “walking corpses,” who had
given up on themselves and made not even a minimal effort to survive, fascinated
and frightened Levi, who feared becoming one of them. Levi learned the meaning of resistance in the simple act of washing oneself daily with the not-soap provided: survival in Auschwitz was always uncertain, no matter what one did, but
the daily ritual offered the only available form of hope. Themselves a “limit case”
of witnessing and transference, the passive Muselmänner become for Agamben
both the “bereft witness” and “the Gorgon” on whom we must gaze (161). But
LaCapra is quick to point out that Agamben effectively replicates the Nazi gaze in
his depiction of these voiceless victims. Relying heavily on Primo Levi’s account,
Agamben reproduces Levi’s curious erasure of the perpetrators: the camp system
appears to operate autonomously, from external, intangible forces, and very few
visible Nazis (162). While this may have been Levi’s perception of the camp reality, it cannot be sustained as the informed view of a post-Holocaust scholar. With
numb, passive victims and absent, lethal perpetrators, the camps begin to appear
ethereal, dangerously sublime in their fascination and in the hint of what power
may lie beyond: a forgetting—which otherwise would be so ignorant as to be
entirely absurd—of Nazi praxis. LaCapra insists forcefully, and correctly, that to
view the Muselmänner in this way is to ignore the real, intentional application of
power by Nazis and Nazism: “The Muselmänner did not simply ‘move’ into a zone
of abjection; they were kicked, whipped, and beaten into it. And the SS and their
affiliates were the ones who conducted the ‘experiment’ that Agamben seeks to
replicate in his own way” (190).
A new sublimity achieved at the cost of others’ suffering—the category of
experience that can comprehend the Holocaust, without ever fully “understanding”—is potentially exploitative. In his critique of Agamben, LaCapra
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attempts a redemption by highlighting what for him is the crucial concern: the
opposition between immanence (Being-within-the-world) and transcendence
(19). He suggests that this opposition has displaced the sacred or the divine from
the sphere of religion and into the immanent realm of post-traumatic life. The
sublime may well figure as the ultimate connection between past and present.
Like its conceptual cousin, the uncanny, it delimits the boundaries of certainties
about identity and experience. A shiver or shudder accompanies each: tremulousness characterizes the momentary awareness, as brief as it is unrepeatable.
Peter Krapp’s survey of the phenomenon of déjà vu completes the triptych of
uncertain sensations. One experiences a brief disorientation, a sense of experiencing repetition, and almost immediately, an uncertainty or distrust of one’s
knowledge. Déjà vu inverts assumptions about time and space (32); it “eludes
recall,” cannot be shared, and cannot be repeated at will (xx). As a marker of
uncertainty, déjà vu points to a repetition whose origin is unknown, perhaps forgotten. From here, however, Krapp’s deployment of the term will engender its
own confusion and distraction, as he relates it to media studies, psychology, and
cultural studies.
Krapp considers an eclectic assortment of writers (and screenwriter/
producers) in his effort to distinguish among a variety of forms of forgetting associated with déjà vu: Walter Benjamin, Sigmund Freud, Heiner Müller, Andy
Warhol, Clint Eastwood, and Jaques Derrida. Of all these, the discussion of Eastwood’s revisionist Western, Unforgiven (1992), is the most unpredictable and
coherent. Film theorists have suggested that déjà vu and cinema are twins: “in
film . . . everything is recorded (as a memory trace which is immediately so, without having been something else before). . . . a past that was never present before
it came to consciousness as past” (97). In this sense, déjà vu is the awareness of
temporal structures as they “flash” before you. Following the ubiquitous Agamben, Krapp argues that cinema itself enacts déjà vu: “where photography meets
the motor . . . it operates ‘in this interstice’” of past and present (98). In Unforgiven
Eastwood plays a mercenary who is reluctantly drawn back into the game of murder and revenge when a prostitute is attacked and her coworkers offer a bounty
on her attacker. The nominal “law man,” played by Gene Hackman, is corrupt,
and the entire gunslinging action is being recorded by a dime novelist whose loyalties are defined by who will pay him. In this atypical Western, which both
acknowledges and revises the genre, Krapp sees a version of Benjamin’s eternally
deferred Last Judgment, presaged by a “storm of forgiveness” (which in Unforgiven appears in the soggy, muddied, and monochromatic imagery throughout,
and particularly in the climactic scenes) (115). Redemption, time (or eternity),
and forgiveness operate within a stormy matrix. What’s past is prologue; or as
Krapp refers back to Nietzsche, Eastwood’s antihero “forgets most everything in
order to do one thing, he is unjust against what is behind him, and knows only
one right—the right of that which is to come” (116).
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Déjà vu, in these terms, is not always recognizable as one of the triplets of
uncanniness. In media studies’ appropriation of Derrida’s Glas, Krapp sees a
repetitive claim to finding hypertext avant la lettre, in Freudian screen memories,
Champollion’s hieroglyphic deciphering, Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy,
Talmud studies—it appears, “in short [that] everybody already knew” what
would become the modern media revolution in technology. In this way, déjà vu
occurs defensively, when either something old is encountered that had been forgotten, assimilating all predecessors in Borg fashion, or when something is so
extraordinary (sublime?) as to defy immediate comprehension (128). In a cute
but perhaps not entirely useful way, Krapp suggests that “WYSIWYG” (computer
programming jargon for “what you see is what you get”) should be rendered
“WYSIWYF” (what you see is what you forget) (129). You can forget it, because
it can be endlessly repeated, in much the same banal way that Warhol created his
art. The relentless repetition of Warhol’s images and recordings function as
“screen memories” in much the same way that the literal computer screen, displaying redundant information whenever you want it, distracts viewers from
questioning how it got there, much less what it means.
Unwillingness to interrogate the screen/memory has historical antecedents.
Krapp integrates Heiner Müller into the discussion of déjà vu by focusing on
Müller’s role as quasi-Antigone in postwar East German and reunified German
society. For non-Germanists, Krapp’s translation of Müller’s project will be a useful introduction to this pivotal thinker. Müller maintained that postwar German
cultures perpetually deferred the necessary dialogue with the dead: not only with
their own dead leaders but also with the victims of the Third Reich. No amount
of memorial culture or official statements about the past could ever “come to
terms” with the totality of totalitarian horror. In his autobiographical as well as
his poetic and dramatic writings, Müller conducted his own interrogation of the
past. “Müller’s memories must function as obituaries, summoning all available
models of death management between mourning and melancholia” (62). Deliberately refusing both psychoanalytic closure and monumental “fixing” of the
meaning of the past, Müller offered a “countermemory, a motivated modification
of cultural forgetting” (54). It was his unique, solitary task; and in this regard he
is an Antigone, refusing to accept state strictures, insisting on acknowledging his
relationship to the dead. The East German state long maintained its mythic origins as “first victim” of the Third Reich. Voices of conscience like Müller’s are
therefore all the more valuable.
Collective memory, which is shared among the individuals who constitute
it, offers a flexible form for remembering, one uniquely suited to memories of
shared historical significance—and, as Müller persistently reminded, one vulnerable to collective forgetting. In particular, collective memories form around
traumatic historical events, such as war, genocide, and revolution, that, by definition, many people would choose to forget if they could. Collective memories
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routinely include and exclude, remember and forget in the process of achieving
memory collectively, as individuals find a connection among themselves through
experience. Perhaps not coincidentally, collective memory theory grew out of a
nineteenth century still reeling from the political and social upheavals of the
French Revolution. Peter Fritzsche takes the commonplace notion that the Revolution transformed temporal sensibilities so fundamentally as to constitute
“modernity” and explores just how it was that contemporaries experienced the
transformation of time and discovered new relationships to the past. The book
opens with a telling vignette: a traveler on the Rhine River in 1815 notes in his
diaries how the occupants of his boat reflected the general mood and popular
opinions of the time. All of them, regardless of class, religion, or heritage, voiced
similar concerns about the nature of the times, the suddenness of regime change
and wartime instability: “the observer saw people seeing history” (13). The
observer in this case had a particularly acute historical consciousness: Sulpiz
Boisserée, then thirty-two years old, was a close friend of influential Romantic
thinkers such as Dorothea and Friedrich Schlegel, established a major collection
of medieval German art, and sponsored the restoration of the Cologne Cathedral.
But in Boisserée’s observation of his contemporaries, Fritzsche sees a larger trend,
a new awareness of time as something that can be ruptured, resulting in displacement and dispossession on an unprecedented scale, and producing an
accompanying melancholy and nostalgia.
Stranded in Time offers a sweeping panorama of this new consciousness from
the perspective of not only the familiar Romantics, but also from that of ordinary
farmers and tradesmen, housewives as well as aristocrats throughout the nineteenth century. Fritzsche argues that all of them came to see themselves as
Zeitgenossen (contemporaries, or “time comrades, time travelers”) specifically as
a result of the French Revolution’s traumatic temporal earthquake. The very
modern idea of “contemporary,” he suggests, is rooted in this moment’s “remarkable synchronization of nineteenth-century European culture” (53). Collectives
form not just around memory, but also around traumatic memories of what only
a moment before seemed to be “the present.”
This uncanny new present—which paradoxically is coextensive with the
lived experience of those who feel displaced—creates “exiles who had become
estranged from their own time, that is, stranded in the present, and as a result came
to read contemporary history as dispossession” (55–56). In the chapter titled
“Strangers,” Fritzsche outlines the historical consciousness of French aristocrats,
with François-René Chateaubriand providing the most poignant example.
Fritzsche relies upon well-known Romantics for their intensely personal
responses to their world, expressed in their proclivity for self-reflection and selfexamination in memoirs, diaries, and correspondence. Citing Marilyn Yalom, he
points out that “the French Revolution generated an outpouring of memoirs
equaled only by the survivor literature of World War II” (82). This is a particularly
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provocative comparison. While Fritzsche denies any intention to make the experiences of the Holocaust and the Revolution equivalent, he does want to compare
responses to trauma and suggest that these two events are bookends of a form of
historical consciousness. As the émigrés and their families kept the flames of
memory alight (and in print), they contributed to the “mythistory” of the Revolution and its (political and familial) meaning in the present. Survivor testimony,
often belated, has nevertheless served a similar function—or been utilized to support numerous agendas, each of them rooted in a collective memory. Estranged,
dispossessed, exiled—these are the itineraries of modernity.
Nostalgia for the ancien régime is only one component of a longing for premodern times. Traces of the old resurfaced in the new, as if they had never been
seen before: historical artifacts, collected anew in the Museum of French Monuments and elsewhere, became representatives of the material culture of memory not because they were newly ruined, but because their status as ruin was now
remarked for the first time as being politically significant. “The culture of
remembrance became a political force [in modernity]. . . . the perpetual present,
the ruin of the ruin, the permanence and preemption of empire, that constituted
the real destructive potential of modernity” (128). In terms of the triplets mentioned earlier (the uncanny, sublime, and déjà vu), one can see how the meaning of dispossession and displacement was stimulated by the recognition of
ruins in the field of historicized vision. For viewers such as Boisserée, the
Cologne Cathedral’s incomplete status “suddenly” called for restoration; in
England poets responded to the enclosure system with paeans to Nature; and
the Brothers Grimm began to collect fairy tales and etymologies before they, too,
should fall into ruinous disuse (chs. 3–4). Inspired by (sublime) impressions of
what had “suddenly” appeared before them (and yet had been there all along,
though undervalued), Romantics led the way for nineteenth-century historical
consciousness to experience déjà vu as the return of what they had never noticed
before.
Fritzsche’s survey is ambitious, covering not only Germany but France,
England, and America (in a discussion of the domestic sphere as a realm of memory, from antiques filled with memorabilia and a newly acquired market value, to
quilts and scrapbooks made and preserved by women). He leaves out perhaps
the most obvious source for expressions of historical consciousness, the historians themselves, and their amateur or dilettante collaborators, such as the women
writers described by Bonnie Smith in The Gender of History (1998). But in a project of this scope, leaving out a few obvious suspects does not make the lineup any
less compelling. Fritzsche has expanded the narrow scope of Romantic historical consciousness to become emblematic of an entire century, if not a modernity
that we still inhabit. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a historical consciousness
that does not fit into Fritzsche’s Romantic-based mode; even if we looked outside
the Western tradition, we could only imagine ourselves outside the modernist
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box if we could release ourselves from those entangled longings of nostalgia and
melancholy that connect us to our traumatic histories.
We may be stranded in a present of modernity, despite (perhaps even in
direct connection to) our postmodernity. Fritzsche and Bruno Latour, among
others, have suggested that the postmodern is itself inextricably rooted in the
modern. Postmodernism did not “follow” modernity: it revealed an awareness of
modernity’s self-construction. Ernst Breisach’s On the Future of History speaks for
many in his trepidation about postmodernism’s challenge to historical practice,
but as he in fact shows quite easily, postmodernism is a construct within modernity; pace Latour, “we have not yet been modern” nor have we been postmodern,
since we are still operating within the realm of consciousness inspired by the Revolution. Try to define any term, frame any project, without reference to a self,
identity, or subject that is not itself a modern project; you cannot. Breisach took
on the task of sorting out this conundrum; his presumed audience would be
graduate students like some I know who are overwhelmed in their first year of
study by references to “ontology,” différance, “the trace,” and other terms that are
new to them. While some students may find the book useful, my recommendation to their instructors would be to follow Breisach’s own neatly outlined reading list and assign those authors instead. Breisach’s initial discussion of the
historico-etymological precedents for the term “postmodernism” will dismay
and distract those who are trying to work through Derrida, since it has nothing
to do with postmodernist theory. The authors Breisach selects are presented
without historical context or intellectual biography, which may leave students
wondering why, for instance, so many people suddenly cared about Russian formalism in linguistics.
Any effort to positively define theories built on the apophatic triplets is perhaps doomed at the start, however heroic the attempt (LaCapra and Krapp both
work within this vein, but neither attempts to portray postmodernism as a whole,
which is wise). And it is true, as Breisach modestly states, “that the challenge of
postmodernism went to the foundation of life and history also explained why the
ensuing debate has proved to be intricate, often opaque, but always fervent”
(110). The sublime effect, after all, temporarily stuns those who experience it,
who shudder in response and wonder just what that tajar was anyway.
University of Arizona
In Memoriam: Jacques Derrida
In Peter Krapp’s Déjà vu, I learned that although Heiner Müller and Derrida
intended to meet and to speak about each other’s work, the proposed meeting
was postponed and they were unable to meet before Müller died in 1998. He
asked, at his deathbed, that Derrida speak at his funeral. Derrida declined, not
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because he intended disrespect, but because he sensed that “this treason remains
faithful . . . because this moment remains more unforgettable, more deeply
inscribed in my heart, more faithfully turned toward him than if I had pronounced some words in public in the big Berlin theater of solemn mourning”
(qtd. in Krapp, 207). He chooses to speak about not choosing to speak, to voice
grief and respect. Writing this essay, reflecting on Derrida’s work, I learned of his
death. For all the future work that now we will not be able to read, as much as for
the richness of what we were given, Derrida will be missed.

